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MISSOURI SPORTS LAW
ADAM EPSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to present a brief perspective and
overview on how individuals and sports teams associated with the
state of Missouri have had an impact on sports law in general.  This
includes a discussion of prominent cases involving fantasy sports sta-
tistics, the Kansas City Royals mascot Sluggerrr, the unfortunate
death of University of Missouri football player Aaron O’Neal, and
the 2011 litigation between the National Football League and the
players’ union, the NFLPA.  This presentation-turned-article synthe-
sizes Missouri-related cases and decisions, demonstrating that the
legal issues are quite broad and varied in this area of the law.  Some
represent significant state and federal sports law cases including
those that have been initiated in or traveled through Missouri via
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Other examples did not lead
to litigation but certainly demonstrate legal issues and have a legal
flavor thereby generating discussion and debate in sports law cir-
cles.  With several professional sports teams and major college uni-
versities within the state, the impact on the sports industry from this
state is significant and addressed where appropriate.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the most recent census, the state of Missouri, also
known as “The Show Me State,” ranks eighteenth in terms of popu-
lation in the United States.1  Missouri’s impact on sports law has
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1. See Eric Ostermeier, Missouri’s Population Trends Over the Last 100 Years,
SMART POLITICS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/cspg/smartpolitics/
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been moderate, though its impact on the sports industry remains
significant.2  The purpose of this paper is to present a brief perspec-
tive and overview on how individuals and teams associated with the
state of Missouri have had an impact on sports law in general.  First,
and more as a matter of trivia, many are unaware that the state of
Missouri hosted the 1904 Summer Olympics in St. Louis, which was
the first time the Olympic Games were hosted in the United States.3
Indeed, at one time the national headquarters for the NCAA was
located in Kansas City, Missouri (1952), although it has since
moved to Indianapolis, Indiana (1999), where it presently resides.4
Professional sports teams in Missouri are abundant and mem-
bers of the Big Four sports leagues include the NHL’s St. Louis
Blues, MLB’s St. Louis Cardinals and Kansas City Royals, and the
NFL’s St. Louis Rams and Kansas City Chiefs, among others.5
2011/03/missouris_population_trends_ov.php (explaining over past 100 years,
Missouri has fallen from seventh most populous state to eighteenth).  It is also
worth noting that there are sixty-seven accredited, degree-granting, postsecondary
institutions in Missouri, including thirteen public universities, thirty-nine private
four-year institutions, and thirteen community colleges. See List of Colleges and Uni-
versities in Missouri (MO), COLLEGESTATS.ORG, http://collegestats.org/colleges/mis-
souri (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (listing accredited colleges and universities
residing in Missouri).
2. See Eric Fisher & Terry Lefton, K.C. Delivers for League, Fans, Sponsors, SPORTS
BUS. J. (July 16, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/
07/16/Events-and-Attractions/MLB-All-Star.aspx (noting that “Kansas City, MLB’s
third-smallest market,” produced sizeable television ratings gains in 2012 over pre-
vious year’s All-Star Games in Phoenix (2011) and Anaheim (2010)).
3. See St Louis 1904, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/st-louis-1904-sum-
mer-olympics (last visited Mar. 3, 2013) (providing pertinent facts about St. Louis
Olympic Games, including opening and closing date, medalists, and pictures).
4. See ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 19 (2013) (explaining NCAA still outsources
drug testing to National Center for Drug Free Sport in Kansas City and conducts
approximately 13,000 tests per year); see also National Center for Drug Free Sport, DRUG
FREE SPORT, http://www.drugfreesport.com/index.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2013)
(holding themselves to be “premier provider of drug testing services, drug screen-
ing policies, and drug education programs in sport” with headquarters in Kansas
City).
5. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining phrase “Big Four” is associated
with four major sports leagues in United States including National Football League
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA), and
National Hockey League (NHL)); see also Greg Caggiano, Turnin’ Back the NHL
Clock: Kansas City Scouts, BLEACHER REPORT (June 25, 2008), http://bleacherreport.
com/articles/32553-turnin-back-the-nhl-clock-kansas-city-scouts (noting that Kan-
sas City Scouts was professional ice hockey team in NHL from 1974–76, then relo-
cated to Denver and became Colorado Rockies (later New Jersey Devils when they
moved again in 1982)); see also James Dornbrook, Kansas City Command Bows Out;
New Team Forms in New League, KANSAS CITY BUS. J. (Aug. 23, 2012, 11:05 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2012/08/23/kansas-city-command-
bows-out-new-team.html?page=all (listing Missouri’s multiple professional sports
teams).  Missouri has had a host of other professional sports teams, including the
Major League Soccer (MLS) team Sporting Kansas City (formerly the Kansas City
2
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There once was an NBA team in Missouri—the Kansas City Kings—
but the organization moved to Sacramento in 1985 and is now
known as the Sacramento Kings.6  This article synthesizes Missouri-
related cases and decisions, demonstrating that the legal issues are
quite broad and varied in this area of the law.  Some represent sig-
nificant state and federal sports law cases, including those that have
been initiated in or traveled through Missouri via the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.7  Other examples did not lead to litigation but
certainly have a legal flavor and a discussion is warranted in sports
law circles.8
A. Fantasy Sports
In C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P.,9 Major League Baseball Advanced Media (MLBAM),
the marketing arm for MLB, claimed that it owned the name and
statistics which are used in fantasy sports, much to the chagrin of
die-hard fantasy sports addicts.10  MLBAM claimed that if a com-
pany such as C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing (CBC), based in St.
Louis, wanted to use MLB statistics for fantasy sports, the company
would have to pay to obtain a license to use them from MLBAM.
CBC countered that these statistics were public information and a
matter of public domain, and that using the statistics did not consti-
tute an infringement on the MLB players’ right of publicity, also
Wizards), Major Indoor Soccer League teams St. Louis Steamers and Kansas City
Comets, and the Arena Football League (AFL) team Kansas City Command (for-
merly Kansas City Brigade), which folded in late 2012.
6. See Frank Fleming, Kansas City Kings, SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 12, 2011),
http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nba/kcomaha/kckings.html (detailing history
of NBA team Kansas City Kings).
7. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov (last visited Mar. 3. 2013) (provid-
ing information about Eighth Circuit, which is comprised of Arkansas, Iowa, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota).
8. See Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch.
Dist., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54388, at *26-27 (W.D. Mo. June 3, 2010), aff’d 640
F.3d 329 (8th Cir. 2011) (recounting such example from 2010 case in which fed-
eral district court in Missouri held that local school district’s decision to stop dis-
tributing flyers to parents through local schools, including flyer for summer soccer
camp called Victory Through Jesus, was reasonable and did not violate First Amend-
ment or Equal Protection Clause (Fourteenth Amendment) of Constitution since
distribution was non-public forum).
9. 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (ruling in favor of C.B.C. and fantasy
sport players).
10. See id. at 1107 (granting CBC’s motion for summary judgment and enter-
ing injunction to prevent MLBPA and MLBAM from interfering with CBC’s using
players’ names and playing records on its website and in its fantasy baseball
games).
3
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known as the tort of commercial misappropriation.  In 2007, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment
(i.e., free speech) right to use this information outweighed any
state rights involving rights of publicity.11  Thus, names and statis-
tics are not commercially protectable and remain part of the public
domain, at least for now, and much to the pleasure of fantasy sports
players and addicts.12
B. Tony Twist
In another intellectual property rights case, Doe v. McFarlane,13
a jury verdict of $15 million against a comic book creator was af-
firmed, holding that the use of the plaintiff’s name for a character
in a comic book series was not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion because it was for the purpose of selling comic books and not
as an expressive comment about the plaintiff.14  Defendant Todd
McFarlane created a popular comic book called Spawn that fea-
tured a villain and fictional Mafia boss named Antonio Twistelli.15
McFarlane admitted he named his character after the plaintiff, a
former professional hockey player with the St. Louis Blues, who also
was known as a hockey enforcer.16
The history of the case is quite convoluted.  After a trial, a jury
awarded $24.5 million to Twist in 2000.  However, the trial court
11. See id.; see also C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that CBC,
which uses trade name CDM Fantasy Sports, is corporation whose primary offices
are located in St. Louis, Missouri, and markets, distributes, and sells fantasy sports
products, including fantasy baseball games, accessible over Internet).  It should be
noted that MLBAM had counterclaimed, alleging that CBC’s use of Players’ Rights
and Trademarks violated the federal Lanham Act, Missouri state trademark law,
state unfair competition laws, and state false advertising laws. See C.B.C. Distribution
& Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 820.
12. See, e.g., David G. Roberts, Jr., The Right of Publicity and Fantasy Sports: Why
the C.B.C. Distribution Court Got It Wrong, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 230 (2007)
(suggesting that not only did CBC court generally misapply appropriate prima fa-
cie legal analysis to right of publicity claim, but that court simply did not under-
stand intricacies and true purpose of fantasy sports games); see also Risa J. Weaver,
Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 2010
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, 35 (2010) (offering that “federal statute could alleviate
problems that arise from disparate treatment states give to right of publicity.”).
13. 207 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Doe v.
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
14. See id. at 60, 62 (discussing why precedent in Doe binds court to decline
First Amendment protection).
15. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on the Constitutional
Scale: Weighing Speech against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1503, 1507 (2009) (not-
ing that case pushed Todd McFarlane Productions, Inc. into bankruptcy).
16. See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 367 (reprinting McFarlane’s character description
of Twist in Spawn comic).
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entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  After a second
trial, a jury awarded $15 million to Twist in 2004.  The appellate
court affirmed and concluded that McFarlane’s use merited no
First Amendment protection because the use of Twist’s name was
predominantly commercial rather than expressive or literary since
the primary purpose was to sell comic books.17
Twist presented evidence that McFarlane intended to create
the impression that Twist was associated with McFarlane’s comic
book, marketed comic books to hockey fans, and induced readers
to purchase the comic book in order to see hockey players’
names.18  The circuitous case (and the verdict) was upheld in 2006
after two appeals.19  In 2007, Twist and McFarlane settled the law-
suit out of court for $5 million.20  Todd McFarlane Productions,
Inc. emerged from bankruptcy in May 2012.21
C. Sluggerrr
In a traditional sports torts case, in 2010 the Kansas City Royals
and its team mascot Sluggerrr were sued by spectator John Coomer
(Overland Park, Kansas) who claimed that he was hit in the eye with
a hot dog thrown by the mascot from behind its back at Kauffman
Stadium.22  In his complaint, Coomer characterized the mascot as
an “agent, servant and/or employee” of the Royals who threw the
17. See id. at 365 (outlining procedural history of litigation between Twist and
comic book parties); see also Melissa Desormeaux, When Your Rights Depend on Your
Paycheck: The Scary Ways Courts are Deciding Right of Publicity Cases, 12 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 277, 284 (2009) (noting that Missouri Supreme Court used “‘pre-
dominant purpose test” to balance First Amendment with publicity rights).
18. See Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 371 (“Twist contends, and this Court again agrees,
that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to establish respondents’ intent to
gain a commercial advantage by using Twist’s name to attract consumer attention
to Spawn comic books and related products.”).
19. See Doe, 207 S.W.3d at 76 (discussing how court found no error in previous
cases and chose to uphold verdict).
20. See Brigid Alverson & JK Parkin, Todd McFarlane Productions Emerges from
Bankruptcy, COMIC BOOK RESOURCES (May 2, 2012), http://robot6.comicbookre-
sources.com/2012/05/comics-a-m-todd-mcfarlane-productions-emerges-from-
bankruptcy/ (discussing settlement subsequent to $15 million verdict in favor of
Twist).
21. See id. (“Todd McFarlane Productions has emerged from bankruptcy after
more than seven years, having paid more than $2.2 million to creditors”).
22. See Man Sues Royals for Sluggerrr Causing Eye Damage with Hot Dog, KCTV5
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.kctv5.com/story/14780073/man-sues-royals-for-slug-
gerrr-causing-eye-damage-with-hot-dog-2-23-2010 (“A man has sued the Kansas City
Royals for $25,000 after he claims a hot dog thrown from Royals mascot Sluggerrr
caused severe eye damage.”).
5
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hot dog recklessly.23  As a result of the Sluggerrr’s toss, Coomer
claimed that the hot dog hit him in the eye and detached his ret-
ina.24  Coomer demanded compensatory damages, alleging negli-
gence and battery.25  A jury, however, ruled in favor of Sluggerrr
(and the Kansas City Royals) in 2011.26  Accordingly, Coomer was
disappointed with the decision.27
D. Handwerker
In Handwerker v. T.K.D. Kid, Inc.,28 plaintiff Karen Handwerker
appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant, T.K.D. Kid, Inc., in a lawsuit for damages for bodily in-
jury which occurred as part of a women’s self-defense seminar in
which she was subjected to a simulated attack.29  The trial court
granted summary judgment for T.K.D. because Handwerker had
signed a waiver containing an exculpatory clause in favor of T.K.D.,
but the appellate court reversed and remanded.  The waiver con-
tained the following clause:
I, [plaintiff] understand that there is a risk in partici-
pating in above seminar and that I will assume all risks and
liabilities in attending said seminar.  The sponsor, any
23. See Petition (TF) at 2, Coomer v. K.C. Royals Baseball Corp., No. 1016-
CV04073 (Mo. Cir. Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://kevinunderhill.typepad.com/
Documents/Pleadings/Slugger.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (detailing Coomer’s
complaint against Royals).
24. See id. (alleging extent of Coomer’s eye injury).
25. See id. at 3-4 (stating claims for negligence under doctrine of respondeat
superior for failing to train employees in safe hot dog throwing methods and for
battery for intentionally throwing hot dog).
26. See Jury Rules for Royals in Hurled Hot Dog Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
9, 2011, available at http://www.morningsun.net/newsnow/x698037912/Jury-
rules-for-Royals-in-hurled-hot-dog-lawsuit (noting that “Royals argued that
Coomer, a longtime Kansas City fan who . . . attended 175 games, was sitting six
rows behind the third-base dugout and should have taken more responsibility for
his personal protection.”).  Byron Shores “played the role of Sluggerrr from Febru-
ary 1996 to October 2009,” traveled across the country teaching mascot classes,
wore the Truman Tiger costume for the University of Missouri, and was even
named Big 8 Mascot of the Year. See id. (emphasizing extensive experience of
mascot).  However, the trial court’s judgment was recently reversed and remanded
for further proceedings. See Coomer v. K.C. Royals Baseball Corp., 2013 WL
150838 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013) (reversing and remanding trial court’s judg-
ment in favor of K.C. Royals based on, among other things, errors made in in-
structing jury on assumption of risk).
27. See id. (reporting that Coomer stated he was “hugely disappointed” by
jury’s decision).
28. 924 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
29. See id. at 622 (holding that exculpatory clauses that do not use terms “neg-
ligence” or “fault” or their equivalents are ambiguous).
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companies, corporations or employees and/or manage-
ment of sponsor, companies or corporation promoting
this seminar, as well as staff members or instructors of
Amanat’s Self-Defense System shall not be held responsi-
ble in the event of any injury incurred in the course of this
seminar.  I also acknowledge that I have read this agree-
ment in it’s [sic] entirety, and that I understand the terms
of this agreement and have received a copy for my
records.30
The court held that because the exculpatory clause signed by
plaintiff did not employ the terms “negligence” or “fault” or their
equivalents, a clear and unmistakable waiver had not occurred.31
E. Maldonado
In another sports torts case, 2003’s Maldonado v. Gateway Hotel
Holdings, L.L.C., the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s award of $13.7 million in compensatory damages to Mexi-
can boxer Fernando Ibarra Maldonado against the Regal Riverfront
Hotel owner and the match’s promoter, Doug Hartmann Produc-
tions, L.L.C.32  The hotel was found negligent for failing to have
medical monitoring and an ambulance present at the hotel during
the 1999 boxing match, an unthinkable omission by today’s stan-
dards.33  The court noted that under the inherently dangerous ac-
30. Id.
31. See id. (citing Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330,
337-38 (Mo. 1996)) (stating “[t]he words ‘negligence’ or ‘fault’ or their
equivalents must be used conspicuously so that a clear and unmistakable waiver
and shifting of risk occurs.  There must be no doubt that a reasonable person
agreeing to an exculpatory clause actually understands what future claims he or
she is waiving.”).
32. See Maldonado v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, L.L.C., 154 S.W.3d 303 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003), aff’d 154 S.W.3d 303, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that con-
tract entered between Gateway and Hartmann required Hartmann to secure
$5,000,000 in indemnity insurance and to “provide a doctor at ringside and an
ambulance on stand-by at the hotel on the night of the event”).  The Regal River-
front Hotel is currently known as the Millennium Hotel and is located in down-
town St. Louis. See Regal Riverfront becomes Millennium Hotel-St. Louis, ST. LOUIS BUS.
J. (Apr. 9, 2001, 8:38 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2001/04/
09/daily2.html (describing change in hotel’s name after it was acquired by Millen-
nium Hotels and Resorts in 1999).
33. See, e.g., Adam Epstein, Body Blow: Boxer Chases Ambulance and Wins Judg-
ment, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 12 (2004) (providing commentary on impact of Mal-
donado v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, L.L.C.). But see Gateway Hotel Holdings, Inc. v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 275 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming exclusion
clause in general insurance policy, stating that “this insurance does not apply to
‘bodily injury’ to any person while practicing for or participating in any sports or
athletic contest or exhibition that you sponsor,” and thus denying Gateway plain-
7
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tivity exception to landowner liability, a landowner hiring an
independent contractor to perform an inherently dangerous activ-
ity has a “nondelegable duty to take special precautions to prevent
injury from the activity.”34
F. O’Neal
Although it did not establish legal precedent per se, the death
of University of Missouri (UM) football player Aaron O’Neal on
July 12, 2005 at age 19 garnered national attention and generated
discussion over the potential liability for institutions when a stu-
dent-athlete has the hereditary sickle cell trait in which sickle-
shaped blood cells carry less oxygen and can clog blood vessels that
flow to the heart and elsewhere.35  O’Neal died after participating
in a hot and humid pre-season training session even though some
coaches and training staff members were present.36  Unfortunately,
the University of Missouri was apparently unaware of his congenital
trait.37  After O’Neal’s parents filed a wrongful death suit against
UM, UM and the O’Neals reached a $2 million settlement.38  Other
college football players around the country had also died under
similar circumstances.39  Partially as a result of O’Neal’s death, in
tiffs’ and Liberty Mutual plaintiffs’ reimbursement for defense costs); see also Kait-
lyn Anne Wild ed., Recent Developments in Sports Law, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 437,
557 (2009) (providing summary of facts and court’s holding in Gateway Hotel Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.).
34. See Maldonado, 154 S.W.3d at 307 (quoting Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc.,
990 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)) (explaining application of inherently
dangerous activity exception to landowner liability).
35. See Mizzou Settles Suit in ‘05 Player Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 10, 2009,
available at http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3968448 [hereinafter
Mizzou Settles] (noting that O’Neal was St. Louis native and reserve linebacker); see
also Sickle Cell Anemia, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001554/ (explaining sickle-cell anemia as disorder
in which sickle-shaped blood cells carry less oxygen than regular blood cells and
clog blood vessels flowing from heart to elsewhere).
36. See Mizzou Settles, supra note 35 (noting that NCAA rules prohibit head
coaches and their assistants from attending such workouts, which are normally led
by strength and conditioning coaches and monitored by trainers).
37. See Dave Matter, Schools Worry Over Sickle Cell Dangers, COLUMBIA DAILY
TRIB. (June 11, 2009), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/jun/11/
schools-worry-over-sickle-cell-dangers/ (pointing out that county medical examiner
cited lymphocytic meningitis as official cause of death though subsequent medical
opinions disagreed with that determination).
38. See id. (suggesting that initial estimate of O’Neal’s cause of death was un-
likely after posthumous sickle cell diagnosis).
39. See id. (noting that study obtained by CBSSports.com determined exer-
tional sickling to be leading cause of death for NCAA football players that decade,
including Central Florida receiver Ereck Plancher and North Carolina A&T offen-
sive lineman Chad Wiley).
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2007 the National Athletic Trainers’ Association (NATA) recom-
mended that college teams screen athletes for the inherited blood
disorder.40
G. TEAM America
Sports agents suing their clients (or each other) over claims
related to defamatory statements, violations of no compete clauses,
or tampering by other agents are relatively rare, though the fre-
quency of such suits has increased in recent years.41  In Total Eco-
nomic Athletic Management of America, Inc. v. Pickens,42 a breach of
contract case, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a $20,000 ver-
dict for a sports agency (d/b/a Team America) against a former
student-athlete Bruce Pickens (University of Nebraska) for wrong-
ful termination of the agency agreement despite the agent’s viola-
tion of NCAA extra benefit rules.43  The sports agent, Howard
Misle, signed a contract with the football player to act as his agent
during contract negotiations with the NFL, but Pickens hired a dif-
ferent agent to represent him during the actual negotiations.44
The agent sued for breach of contract, and the trial court awarded
the agency damages that were upheld on appeal.45
H. Pottgen
In Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Association,46 Ed-
ward Leo Pottgen wanted to participate on his school baseball
team.47  However, Pottgen had been held back for two years in ele-
40. See Mizzou Settles, supra note 35 (noting some trainers mistake sickle-cell
injury for heat exhaustion, muscle cramps, or heart problems).
41. See generally Adam Epstein & Bridget Niland, Sports Agent Litigation and the
Regulatory Environment, 11 ATLANTIC L.J. 36 (2009) (reviewing general regulatory
environment of sports agency and focusing on NCAA-professional league conflicts
over athletes still eligible for collegiate participation).
42. 898 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
43. See id. at 101 (affirming lower court judgment in favor of Team America
in anticipatory breach of contract lawsuit).  Pickens was drafted third overall in the
1991 NFL draft by the Atlanta Falcons. See id. at 103 (noting order in which Pick-
ens was selected during 1991 NFL draft).
44. See id. (explaining that Pickens promised to return car and other mone-
tary gifts to Misle after choosing Tom Condon, former Kansas City Chief based in
Kansas City, as agent).  Misle, a certified NFLPA contract advisor, also owned other
businesses, including a car dealership in Lincoln, Nebraska. See id. at 102 (describ-
ing Misle’s other business ventures).
45. See id. at 101 (upholding $20,000 judgment for Team America on appeal).
The commission was based on a four percent fee. See id. at 108 (calculating ex-
pected damages of $108,000 at rate of four percent commission).
46. 103 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997).
47. See id. at 722 (summarizing facts of case).
9
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mentary school due to a learning disability, which caused him to
exceed the maximum age limitation on high school athletic partici-
pation.48  Courts in Missouri have supported the principle of maxi-
mum age rules for participation in high school sports.49
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
age 19 requirement was essential and agreed with the MSHSAA
(which had lost at the district court level) that a waiver of this age
requirement “would constitute a fundamental alteration in the na-
ture of the baseball program.”50  The court concluded that the age
19 rule did not violate either the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.51  More recently,
the discussion of the appropriateness of age 19 rules reached the
national level in its focus on a Michigan high school student with
Down syndrome, whose ability to play sports was also limited by the
age ceiling.52
I. Curt Flood
It might be sacrilege to fail to mention the curious case of Curt
Flood when discussing Missouri sports law-related decisions.  Curt
Flood filed a lawsuit with support of Marvin Miller, a former econo-
mist with the United Auto Workers (UAW), against MLB challeng-
ing the legitimacy of MLB’s reserve clause.53  The reserve clause, a
provision in MLB contracts, had been interpreted to mean that
once a player signed a professional contract, the MLB team owned
the player’s rights in that league for the remainder of their career,
unless he was traded.54
48. See id. (describing how Pottgen came to exceed maximum age limitation
on high school athletic participation).
49. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 253-55 (explaining maximum age rules for
participation in high school sports).
50. See id.  Like most states, Missouri courts have had to intervene in athletic
eligibility issues and disputes covering a wide variety of sorts other than disabilities.
See, e.g., Letendre v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 86 S.W.3d 63 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2002) (upholding MSHSAA bylaw which prohibited students, in this case
15-year-old female swimmer, from competing on both school and non-school team
in same sport during school team’s season).
51. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 253-55 (concluding that age 19 rule does not
violate law).
52. See Joshua R. Miller, Michigan High Schooler with Down Syndrome Gets New
Shot at Playing Hoops, FOX NEWS (May 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/
2012/05/08/michigan-high-schools-to-vote-on-challenge-to-age-limit-rule-by-stu-
dent-with/ (discussing situation involving Eric Dompierre, “19-year-old junior at
Ishpeming High School”).
53. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 350-51 (describing lawsuit).
54. See id. (defining “reserve clause”).
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Flood, the all-star outfielder, played for the St. Louis Cardinals
but refused to accept a trade to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969,
stating:
After twelve years in the major leagues, I do not feel I am a
piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my
wishes.  I believe that any system which produces that re-
sult violates my basic rights as a citizen and is inconsistent
with the laws of the United States and of the several States.
It is my desire to play baseball in 1970, and I am capable of
playing.
I have received a contract offer from the Philadelphia
club, but I believe I have the right to consider offers from
other clubs before making any decision.  I, therefore, re-
quest that you make known to all Major League clubs my
feelings in this matter, and advise them of my availability
for the 1970 season.55
Flood sued MLB and Commissioner Bowie Kuhn in order to be-
come a free agent, arguing that the reserve clause was an unreason-
able restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.  Flood asserted that
a reasonable interpretation of the reserve clause might be that of a
one-shot deal, which would give a team the ability to renew a
player’s contract for only one year not to be built on top of a previ-
ous extension.  Flood sat out the 1970 season and was traded to the
Washington Senators the next year.  His career ended when he re-
tired after playing only 13 games for the Senators in 1971.56
In 1972 the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 5-3 deci-
sion, acknowledged that MLB’s antitrust exemption found in the
infamous 1922 Federal Baseball decision was an anomaly, but it in-
sisted that it was up to Congress to change this antitrust exemption
not the Supreme Court.57  However, arbitrator Peter Seitz changed
55. Letter from Curt Flood, Player, Major League Baseball, to Bowie K. Kuhn,
Commissioner, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (Dec. 24, 1969), available at http://www.
stlcardinalbaseball.com/curt-flood (providing letter from Curt Flood explaining
why he refused to accept trade to Philadelphia Phillies).
56. See Curt Flood, STL CARDINAL BASEBALL, http://www.stlcardinalbaseball.
com/curt-flood (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (describing Flood’s negative reaction to
reserve clause).
57. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (referencing Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922)); see also Adam Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 5, 7-10 (2011) (examining anomalous Supreme Court
decision). But see Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM.
BUS. L.J. 211, 273 (2012) (offering that even though decision may be anomaly, that
net effect of exemption is procompetitive and that Congress has used threats of
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the landscape of MLB and U.S. sports with his arbitration decision
in 1975.58  Players Andy Messersmith (Los Angeles Dodgers) and
Dave McNally (Montreal Expos) challenged the reserve clause after
Flood’s unsuccessful legal battle.  Seitz ruled in December 1975
that baseball’s reserve clause granted a team only one additional
year of service from a player, putting an end to perpetual renewal
right the MLB clubs had claimed for so long.  Seitz’s decision was
appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals unsuccessfully.59
Free agency began in MLB in 1976 and worked its way to all the
other Big Four leagues soon thereafter.60
J. NFL Cases: Labor Law and Franchise Relocation
There is a long, storied history of sports law cases involving the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals focusing primarily on labor rela-
tions in professional football.61  Prominent football figures includ-
removing exemption in order to “extract a variety of valuable concessions from
baseball.”).
58. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 351 (recounting Seitz’s arbitration decision
that considerably altered sports in America).  Mr. Epstein writes that The Curt
Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2011), though generally not the landmark law
that was hoped for, was an attempt by Congress to override legislatively the anti-
trust ruling in the Federal Baseball case. See id. This Act gave MLB players, like their
NBA and NFL counterparts, the right to sue the league under antitrust laws pro-
vided they first decertify as a union. See id. Still, the Act is limited to certain activi-
ties of baseball and has little effect on prior court decisions. See id. For example, it
does not apply to minor leagues franchise relocation, club ownership, the relation-
ship between the Commissioner and the owners, the relationship with umpires,
and others. See id.
59. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 409 F. Supp. 233, 261 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
Messersmith courted an offer from the Kansas City Royals after becoming a free
agent from the Los Angeles Dodgers, but his price tag was too high. See id. at 235-
36.  The Royals then brought the lawsuit defending the reserve system. See id.
60. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 351 (noting advent of free agency); see also
Jerry Crasnick, Donald Fehr Comfortable in his New Role, ESPN (Mar. 23, 2012), http:/
/espn.go.com/nhl/story/_/id/7714142/nhlpa-donald-fehr-brings-invaluable-ex-
perience-bargaining-table (stating that during Fehr’s tenure with MLBPA, average
player salary rose from $289,000 to $3.24 million, and players won $280 million
collusion judgment in late 1980s).  It is worth noting that Donald Fehr was a labor
lawyer from Prairie Village, a suburb of Kansas City, Missouri.  He assisted the
MLBPA in the case.  In 1977, Marvin Miller hired Fehr as the MLBPA general
counsel.  Fehr later served as the executive director of the MLBPA from 1986-2009
and is currently the executive director of the NHLPA. See Kurt Helin, Some Agents
Pushing Donald Fehr to Take over NBA Players Union, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 15, 2013, 4:35
PM), http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/02/05/report-some-agents-
pushing-donald-fehr-to-take-over-nba-players-union/ (noting Fehr’s bargaining
success).
61. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th
Cir. 1974) (“[B]y unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule providing for
an automatic fine to be levied against any player who leaves the bench area while a
fight or an altercation is in progress on the football field, [employers] have en-
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ing John Mackey, Freeman McNeil, Marvin Powell, and Reggie
White have been the named plaintiffs in numerous class action law-
suits which have traveled through St. Louis.62  More often than not,
the subject matter emanates from appeals from the U.S. District
Court in Minneapolis, which appears to be the center of the NFL
labor-relations universe.63  Even in 2012, litigation related to de-
cades-old matters weaved its way into the federal judicial system,
which runs through the Eighth Circuit.64
The following represent summaries of these major NFL cases
that have worked their way through the state of Missouri at the fed-
gaged in unfair labor practices.”); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606
(8th Cir. 1976) (holding that Rozelle Rule was violation of antitrust law); Powell v.
Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he non-statu-
tory labor exemption protects agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bar-
gaining relationship . . . beyond impasse.”); White v. Nat’l Football League, 41 F.3d
402 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding district court’s certification of mandatory class rep-
resented by plaintiffs, approval of settlement agreement, and jurisdiction to enjoin
related actions).  But see Nat’l Football League v. McBee &  Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding injunction for NFL and entering permanent in-
junction against defendants for violations of Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq., and Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 705, where restaurant
owners violated plaintiffs’ copyright and violated federal communications law by
broadcasting games via satellite in blacked out areas); see also White v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League, 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that quarterback
Michael Vick was entitled to his roster bonuses, despite fact that he pleaded guilty
to criminal charges and was suspended indefinitely by league commissioner, and
noting that since entry of 1993 consent decree, district court has overseen enforce-
ment of settlement in antitrust class action on numerous occasions, having re-
solved numerous disputes over terms of Stipulation and Settlement Agreement
and collective bargaining agreement that govern player employment in NFL).
62. See Richard Sandomir, Court in Minnesota has been a Home Field for a League’s
Labor Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at SP2, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/03/13/sports/football/13judge.html?pagewanted=all (noting that
named plaintiffs most recently are quarterbacks Tom Brady, Peyton Manning, and
Drew Brees).
63. See Jay Weiner, How Minnesota Became the Center of the NFL Labor Universe,
MINNPOST (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2011/03/
how-minnesota-became-center-nfl-labor-universe (noting that often NFL cases ap-
pear in Judge David Doty’s fourteenth floor courtroom downtown, stemming from
history of labor advice given to NFLPA by Minneapolis law firm Lindquist & Ven-
num and having jurisdiction because there is NFL franchise in district, Minnesota
Vikings, and also noting that lawyer for team owners was Paul Tagliabue, who even-
tually became NFL Commissioner); see also Retirees’ Suit vs. NFLPA Dismissed, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS, May 29, 2012, available at http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/79849
29/judge-dismisses-retired-players-lawsuit-nflpa (noting that lawsuit filed against
NFLPA by retirees was dismissed, yet NFLPA planned to appeal decision to Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis, as is customary).
64. See Michael McCann, Proving That NFL Teams Agreed to a Secret Salary Cap
Will Not Be Easy, SI.COM (May 23, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/
writers/michael_mccann/05/23/nfl/index.html (addressing issue involving
whether NFL and its teams “secretly impose[d] a salary cap of $123 million in
uncapped 2010 NFL season” and filing of case, Reggie White, et al. v. NFL).
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eral level which appear to focus on either player’s rights or
franchise relocation issues.  Unlike professional baseball, as demon-
strated by the Curt Flood case, the NFL is not exempt from federal
antitrust laws.65
II. PLAYER’S RIGHTS
A. Mackey and the Rozelle Rule
In Mackey v. National Football League,66 future NFL Hall of Fame
tight end and NFLPA president John Mackey and 35 other NFL
players challenged NFL salaries and the free agency system in place
at that time by bringing a class action lawsuit challenging restric-
tions on player movement.67  The Rozelle Rule, named after NFL
Commissioner Pete Rozelle, was considered by the players to be an
unreasonable restraint of trade because there was no easy way to
become a free agent.  When a player’s contract expired and he
signed with a different club, the new club had to compensate the
previous club with draft picks, current players, or a sum of money
that was either agreed-upon or imposed by the Commissioner
before a trade was effective.  This, in effect, was professional foot-
ball’s version of baseball’s reserve clause.  The players claimed that
the net effect of the Rozelle Rule was that it kept salaries low, al-
though the NFL argued that it was the byproduct of arms-length
collective bargaining in both 1968 and 1970, thereby falling under
the non-statutory labor exemption.68
The court concluded that in order for the non-statutory labor
exemption to apply, collective bargaining resulting from good faith
arm’s length bargaining must have occurred (which in this case it
held it did not).  The Rozelle Rule was considered a per se violation
at the circuit court level (i.e., a group boycott), but the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that rule of reason analysis was more
appropriate.  It developed what is now known as the three-prong
65. See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (reversing
district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, both of which had held in favor
of NFL lineman Bill Radovich, on grounds that Federal Baseball was controlling,
though Supreme Court held that business of football is clearly engaged in inter-
state commerce, thereby falling under jurisdiction of federal antitrust laws).
66. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
67. See id. at 609 (stating that their complaint alleged that defendants’ en-
forcement of Rozelle Rule constituted illegal combination and conspiracy in re-
straint of trade denying professional football players’ right to freely contract for
their services).
68. See id. at 612-13 (rejecting players’ argument that only employee groups
are entitled to labor exemption and that it could not be asserted by defendant
employer group).
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Mackey test, which has been adopted by the Sixth and Ninth Circuit
Courts as well.69  In the end, the Rozelle Rule, unilaterally created
by the owners, was considered an unreasonable restraint of trade
because the court determined that the rule was not agreed upon as
a result of arm’s length bargaining.70
B. Powell: Expired CBA Extends Beyond Impasse
In Powell v. National Football League,71 a case emanating from
Minnesota, Marvin Powell (New York Jets/Tampa Bay Buccaneers),
along with eight other NFL players and the NFLPA, brought an an-
titrust action against the NFL claiming that the NFL violated anti-
trust law when it continued to enforce the terms of an expired
CBA.72  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
NFL and the players should continue to bargain or present their
claims to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).73  The court
held that the non-statutory labor exemption extends beyond im-
passe, and therefore, the league was not in violation of antitrust
law.74  The effect was that unions were forced to decertify in order
to gain leverage during the bargaining relationship.75  The court
concluded that the labor arena is intended to foster negotiated set-
tlements rather than intervention by the courts.76
69. See id. at 616 (describing bona fide arms-length requirement of bargaining
resulting in CBA).  That is, a CBA is only exempt from antitrust laws when the (1)
restraint primarily affects the parties of the agreement; (2) provision is a
mandatory subject of bargaining under the NLRA; and (3) restraint was a product
of bona fide arms-length bargaining. See id. at 614 (providing principles governing
proper accommodation of competing labor and antitrust interests).
70. See id. at 616 (finding that there was “substantial evidence to support the
finding that there was no bona fide arm’s-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule
preceding the execution of the 1968 and 1970 agreements.”); see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 352 (discussing location of national headquarters for NCAA and of
NCAA drug testing).  A new CBA was reached in 1977 which replaced the Rozelle
Rule with a right of first refusal system in which the current club could match
other offers. See id.
71. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) (presenting action brought by profes-
sional football players’ union against professional football league alleging certain
violations of federal antitrust law).
72. See generally id. (holding labor exemptions continue to protect challenged
restraints until both parties reach impasses regarding those issues); see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 353 (introducing lawsuit brought by Marvin Powell, eight NFL
players, and NFLPA claiming antitrust violations by NFL).
73. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1988)
(offering parties other recourses to relief).
74. See id. at 1303-04 (holding that NFL did not violate antitrust law).
75. See id. at 1309-10 (Lay, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing non-statutory
labor exemptions to extend beyond impasse would lead to unwanted effects).
76. See id. at 1303 (considering policy implications).
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C. McNeil and Unrestricted Free Agency
In McNeil v. National Football League,77 Freeman McNeil (New
York Jets) and seven others, as former members of a now decerti-
fied union, sued alleging that the NFL’s Plan B free agency violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act.78  Plan B had been implemented in
1989 and allowed clubs to protect the rights to thirty-seven players
from entering the free agent market.79  The jury in this antitrust
trial found that league compensation rules were more restrictive
than reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of establishing or
maintaining competitive balance in the NFL.  This caused eco-
nomic harm to the players.  The decision led to the establishment
of unrestricted free agency in the NFL.
D. White and the NFL Salary Cap
In the class action lawsuit White v. National Football League,80 the
claim by Reggie White (Philadelphia Eagles) led to the unrestricted
free agency rights for players, but it also led to a league-wide hard
salary cap.81  In February 1993, the League and a class of NFL play-
ers entered into a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement to resolve
that litigation.82  The settlement agreement (the first CBA since the
1982 CBA expired in 1987) provided that the district court would
retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the agreement, the same
judge who oversaw the McNeil case, Judge David Doty, a President
77. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
78. See id. at 876 (setting forth Count II of plaintiffs’ amended complaint and
stating that plaintiffs seek to bar such Plan B wage scales that would violate Sher-
man Act).
79. See Mitch Truelock, Free Agency in the NFL: Evolution or Revolution?, 47 SMU
L. REV. 1917, 1938 (1994) (describing role of Plan B).
80. 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993), motion for final approval of settlement
granted, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that class action certification was appropriate, that proposed settlement
was fair, and that objections to settlement did not warrant its disapproval).
81. See id. at 1394 (resulting in league-wide salary cap for NFL); see also gener-
ally Alexander M. Bard, Strength in Numbers: The Question of Decertification of Sports
Unions in 2011 and the Benefit of Administrative Oversight, 1 AM. U. LABOR & EMP. L.F.
347 (2011) (discussing collective bargaining and NLRA and uncertainties of decer-
tification in professional sports, and supporting notion that NBPA should remain
certified as exclusive bargaining agent, and that decertifying either union and at-
tempting to individually bargain for contracts without CBA in place will ultimately
hurt players as group).
82. See id. (discussing agreements entered into between both parties to stop
litigation); see also Bard, supra note 81, at 361 (noting that White case was filed only
two weeks after Powell case, and that NFL paid $195 million to class of players and
granted greater free agency to NFL players only after decertification of union).
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Ronald Reagan appointee.83  In fact, Judge Doty has maintained ju-
risdiction (i.e., judicial review) over NFL-NFLPA matters and dis-
putes related to this settlement for almost twenty years since, ruling
frequently in favor of the NFLPA (i.e., the players).84
E. Brady and NFL Lockouts
Most recently in 2011, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brady v.
NFL, bringing the case before Judge Susan Richard Nelson at the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the play-
ers (led by quarterback Tom Brady of the New England Patriots)
successfully enjoined the NFL from continuing its player lockout.85
However, appealing her ruling, the NFL was successful in reinstat-
ing the lockout, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
both temporary and permanent stays of the district court’s ruling
before finally upholding the lockout and remanding the case.86
83. See id. (discussing details of settlement arrangement).  The NFL and the
NFLPA have extended and amended this agreement five times, most recently in
March 2006. See NFL Lockout, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012), http://espn.go.com/nfl/top-
ics/_/page/nfl-labor-negotiations (discussing overall issue of NFL labor
negotiations).
84. See McCann, supra note 64 (noting also, however, that with establishment
of ten-year 2011 CBA, Judge Doty might no longer have jurisdiction over NFL-
NFLPA matters); see also Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, USA TODAY
(Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-
03-03-nfl-labor-disputes-timeline_N.htm (noting that in 2008, NFL and NFLPA ac-
tually agreed to their fifth extension of same White Settlement Agreement in vote
of 30-2 by owners, but that in 2008 “owners vot[ed] unanimously to [ ] opt-out” of
CBA, as per early opt-out clause, citing rising costs).  Such CBA entered its final
year in 2010 in what is known as “uncapped” year. See id. (discussing what it means
to be uncapped for 2010 CBA).
85. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003-04 (D. Minn.
2011) [hereinafter Brady I], vacated, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (granting NFL
players’ claim to enjoin NFL from continuing lockout).
86. See id. (granting NFLPA injunction blocking NFL from imposing lockout);
see also Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Minn. 2011) [herein-
after Brady II] (denying NFL stay of injunction); Brady v. Nat’l Football League,
638 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Brady III] (dissolving Nelson’s order
and granting temporary stay); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 788
(8th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Brady IV] (granting permanent stay and noting that
while imposing lockout, NFL filed complaint with National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) alleging that union decertification was “an unlawful subversion of the col-
lective bargaining process.”); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir.
2011) [hereinafter Brady V] (opting to terminate union’s status as their collective
bargaining agent just before collective bargaining agreement expired and order
granting preliminary injunction was vacated and case was remanded); see also
Gabriel Feldman, Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA: The Shifting Dynamics in Labor-
Management Relations in Professional Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 831, 854 (2012) (citing
Brady V, 644 F.3d at 661; Complaint, Anthony v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, No. 11-
05525 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011)) (noting League’s argument that owners are insu-
lated from antitrust attack even after players disband union); Sarah S. Vance, Com-
petition On and Off the Field: An Analysis of the Role of Antitrust Law in the Continuing
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This decision could be interpreted by other circuits as holding that
lockouts are in fact legal, even in the face of decertified unions
such as the NFLPA which disbanded (i.e. disclaimed) four hours
before the CBA expired on March 12, 2011.87
III. FRANCHISE RELOCATION ISSUES
A. St. Louis Rams
In St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. NFL, the move of
the St. Louis Cardinals football team to Phoenix, Arizona, in 1988
caused the Missouri state legislature, the city of St. Louis, and the
county to find a replacement by the beginning of the 1995 season.88
This resulted in the successful relocation of the Los Angeles Rams
in 1995 to St. Louis.  However, millions of dollars were spent in
order to accomplish the relocation, and the St. Louis Convention
and Visitors Center (CVC), the group designed to find a replace-
ment team for the city, sued the National Football League and NFL
member teams alleging that these expenditures were made neces-
sary by actions of the NFL in violation of antitrust and tort law.89
The St. Louis Rams agreed to pay the NFL fee of $29 million
for moving, of which the CVC would pay $20 million.  In the first
year of play, the CVC was unable to meet its financial obligations.
“The case was tried before a jury for over four weeks before it en-
Evolution of Professional Sports and Intercollegiate Athletics: Introduction, 86 TUL. L. REV.
823 (2012) (summarizing articles in symposium including Feldman’s piece and
others, including Michael H. LeRoy, The Narcotic Effect of Antitrust Law in Profes-
sional Sports: How the Sherman Act Subverts Collective Bargaining, 86 TUL. L. REV. 859
(2012)).
87. See Bard, supra note 81, at 367 (discussing how other circuits view opin-
ion); see also Chris Deubert, Glenn M. Wong & John Howe, All Four Quarters: A
Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the
National Football League, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1 (2012) (examining history of la-
bor negotiations in NFL, including Brady case and 2011 NFL CBA); Clark Griffith,
NFL Ruling Has Changed How Sports Labor Wars are Waged, SPORTS BUS. J. (May 21,
2012), available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/05/
21/Opinion/Clark-Griffith.aspx (noting that federal appeals court found that Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act, which states that courts cannot enjoin actions arising from labor
matters, barred Nelson’s injunction).
88. See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 154
F.3d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing trial regarding Cardinals’ move from St.
Louis to Arizona).
89. See Angela Scafuri, National Football League Relocation Policies Do Not Create
an Anticompetitive Environment—St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission v. Na-
tional Football League, 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998), 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 575-
81 (1999) (discussing reasoning of case and noting, inter alia, that by allowing NFL
to impose costly relocation fees, teams would be less likely to float from one city to
another).
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ded in a judgment in favor of the NFL.”90  CVC argued the NFL
violated antitrust laws because of its relocation rule which provided
that three-fourths of the member clubs must approve any reloca-
tion before it could take place, thereby creating anticompetitive ef-
fects.91  Additionally, CVC’s claim of tortious interference with a
contract was dismissed, since there was no evidence of intentional
interference by the NFL.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit stated “analysis of whether a re-
striction’s harm to competition outweighs any procompetitive ef-
fects is necessary if the anticompetitive impact of a restraint is less
clear or the restraint is necessary for a product to exist at all.”92  To
prevail, the court stated CVC had to prove “(1) there was an agree-
ment among the league and member teams in restraint of trade;
(2) it was injured as a direct and proximate result; and (3) its dam-
ages are capable of ascertainment and not speculative.”93  The
court found CVC failed to meet these elements.  The appellate
court also found that CVC failed to show that prior suppression of
team movement and the anti-movement atmosphere “effectively
prevented all other teams from dealing with CVC” on the lease.94
Thus, the district court decision was upheld.  Moreover, there was
no proof of a violation of antitrust law or another conspiracy.95  As a
result of the decision, the NFL can impose costly relocation fees.
B. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
Although not directly related to any litigation, the Federal
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 became an issue in 2005 when the
NFL had to reschedule a Sunday game between the Kansas City
90. See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n, 154 F.3d at 853 (providing brief
summary of case’s procedural history leading up to this appeal).
91. See Scafuri, supra note 89, at 577 (noting that Article 4.3 of Article IV of
NFL’s Constitution, as amended in 1978, requires three-quarters approval rather
than unanimous approval as it did prior to that).
92. See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n, 154 F.3d at 861 (noting that
CVC must show alleged anticompetitive effect of rule outweighed its procompeti-
tive features).
93. See id. (listing elements CVC needed to prove).
94. See id. at 862 (upholding ruling of trial court).
95. Compare St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n, 154 F.3d at 851, with L.A.
Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984)
(describing Los Angeles Rams’ decision to relocate in 1978 from the L.A. Coli-
seum to new stadium in Anaheim).  The NFL did not approve and the Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission filed suit against the NFL for unlawful restraint of
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id.  After an initial mistrial,
the jury in the second trial ruled in favor of the Coliseum and awarded the plain-
tiffs $50 million in damages holding that the NFL franchise relocation rules vio-
lated federal antitrust laws. See id.
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Chiefs and the Miami Dolphins.  The game was rescheduled for Fri-
day night because of Hurricane Wilma.96  This federal law exempts
professional football, basketball, baseball, and ice hockey from Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Act.97  The game was played and televised
on October 21, 2005, via CBS television affiliates in Miami and Kan-
sas City without a national telecast.  Instead, a tape of the game was
re-broadcast on the NFL’s cable network on Sunday.98  The im-
pending hurricane created a storm under this Act because it allows
the NFL to issue blackouts of games when local teams are being
telecast and when there has not been a sellout at home.  This black-
out rule stipulates that games will not be broadcast in home mar-
kets (i.e., within a seventy-five-mile radius) unless they are sold out
seventy-two hours in advance of the opening kickoff.99  The league
and the NFL Commissioner have complete control to extend or sus-
pend the deadline.  Supposedly, the NFL obtained a waiver from
every high school and college within 75 miles of Miami and Kansas
City to approve the Hurricane Wilma broadcast.
IV. CONCLUSION
The state of Missouri has had its share of sports law cases and
issues.  This makes sense particularly with the host of prominent
professional and intercollegiate teams within its borders.  This arti-
cle summarized some of the more prominent cases, but others
96. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 369-70 (explaining how postponement of
game led to invocation of “blackout rule” under Federal Sports Broadcasting Act);
see also Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (2006).
97. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291 et seq. (“The antitrust
laws, as defined in section 1 of the Act of October 15, 1914 . . . or in the Federal
Trade Commission Act . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of foot-
ball, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in
professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise
transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the spon-
sored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the
case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.”).
98. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 370 (chronicling events leading up to invoca-
tion of “blackout rule” under Federal Trade Commission Act).
99. See Lacie L. Kaiser, Revisiting the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961: A Call for
Equitable Antitrust Immunity from Section One of the Sherman Act for All Professional Sport
Leagues, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1237, 1246-47 (2005) (noting that only extraordinary
conditions can apply for exclusion under “blackout rule”).  “Section 1292 of the
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 also states that ‘black outs’ of games in a ‘home
territory’ are only allowed when the home team is playing a home game that par-
ticular day.” Id. at 1247.  Section 1293 restricts (i.e., prohibits) professional foot-
ball from broadcasting games after six o’clock on Friday nights and all day
Saturday from the second Friday in September to the second Saturday in Decem-
ber on stations within seventy-five miles of any college or high school football con-
test in order to protect intercollegiate and interscholastic football. See id.
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worth exploring include the recent Sluggerrr mascot case involving
the tossing of a hot dog into the stands, cases involving sports agent
contracts and fee disputes, students with disabilities, various sports
tort claims, intellectual property ownership, collective bargaining
and labor law, and franchise relocation.  The state of Missouri re-
mains an active player in litigation and the development of case
precedent related to sports and the law, though the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in St. Louis has had a significant and national
impact on labor relations, particularly with professional football.
Missouri’s state cases mirror the national discussion in the general
categories of tort law, contract law, and so on, representing a mod-
erate impact in sports law.  No doubt Missouri should continue to
impact both sports law and the sports industry given the presence
of Big Four sports franchises in St. Louis and Kansas City, at the
confluence of the Missouri and Kansas Rivers, in the heartland of
America.
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